Emotion, Neuroscience, and Law: A Comment on Darwin and Greene by Mikhail, John
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2011 
Emotion, Neuroscience, and Law: A Comment on Darwin and 
Greene 
John Mikhail 
Georgetown University Law Center, jm455@law.georgetown.edu 
Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 11-26 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/611 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1761295 
 
Emotion Review (forthcoming, 2011) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Torts Commons 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1761295
Emotion, Neuroscience, and Law: A Comment on Darwin 
and Greene 
 
John Mikhail 
 
 
Abstract: Darwin‘s (1871) observation that evolution has produced in us certain emotions 
responding to right and wrong conduct that lack any obvious basis in individual utility is 
a useful springboard from which to clarify the role of emotion in moral judgment.  The 
problem is whether a certain class of moral judgments is ―constituted‖ or ―driven by‖ 
emotion (Greene 2008, p. 108) or merely correlated with emotion while being generated 
by unconscious computations (e.g., Huebner et al. 2008).  With one exception, all of the 
―personal‖ vignettes devised by Greene and colleagues (2001, 2004) and subsequently 
used by other researchers (e.g., Koenigs et al. 2007) in their fMRI and behavioral studies 
of emotional engagement in moral judgment involve violent crimes or torts.  These 
studies thus do much more than highlight the role of emotion in moral judgment; they 
also support the classical rationalist thesis that moral rules are engraved in the mind.  
 
 
 
In The Descent of Man, Darwin (1981/1871, p. 70) affirmed his belief in an innate 
moral faculty, explaining that he fully agreed with Kant and other writers ―that of 
all the differences between man and the lower animals, the moral sense or 
conscience is by far the most important.‖  Darwin insisted that the moral sense is 
not a mysterious gift of unknown origin, however, but the natural result of 
evolution, with antecedents in the social instincts of other animals.  He thus 
famously argued that ―any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social 
instincts, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its 
intellectual powers had become as well developed, or as nearly developed, as in 
man‖ (id. at 71-72).  And he laid the foundation of subsequent research on the 
evolution of morality by examining a range of animal traits and behaviors, 
including their sociability, desire for companionship, and the misery they feel 
when they are abandoned; their love, sympathy, and compassion for one another; 
and their mutual willingness to sacrifice themselves and to render services to one 
another when hunting or defending against attack. 
 
Darwin held that the social instincts of nonhuman animals developed ―for the 
general good of the community,‖ which he defined as ―the means by which the 
greatest possible number of individuals can be reared in full vigor and health, with 
all their faculties perfect, under the conditions to which they are exposed‖ (id. at 
97-98).  The same was true of homo sapiens, he inferred; therefore, neither 
egoism nor a universalistic hedonism (the ―Greatest Happiness Principle‖) was 
descriptively adequate: ―When a man risks his life to save that of a fellow-
creature, it seems more appropriate to say that he acts for the general good or 
welfare, rather than for the general happiness of mankind‖ (id. at 98).  Darwin 
endorsed Herbert Spencer‘s conclusion that ―‗the experiences of utility organized 
and consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have been 
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producing corresponding modifications, which, by continued transmission and 
accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition—certain 
emotions responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in 
the individual experiences of utility‘‖ (id. at 101-102).  Finally, Darwin held that 
this combination of social instincts, intellectual powers, and effects of habit would 
―naturally lead to the golden rule: ‗As ye would that men should do to you, do ye 
to them likewise.‘‖ This rule, he averred, ―lies at the foundation of morality‖ (id. 
at 106). 
 
The idea that evolution has produced in us ―certain emotions responding to right 
and wrong conduct‖ that lack any obvious basis in individual experiences of 
utility is a useful springboard from which to clarify an important problem in the 
cognitive science of moral judgment.  The problem is how to understand the role 
of emotion in moral judgment, and specifically whether a certain class of moral 
judgments is ―constituted‖ or ―driven by‖ emotion (Greene 2008, p. 108; see also 
Greene 2004, 2009; Koenigs et al. 2007) or merely correlated with emotion while 
being generated by unconscious computations (e.g., Huebner et al. 2008).  On at 
least some interpretations, there are important differences between these 
formulations, although these differences may disappear at certain neurocognitive 
or neurobiological levels of scientific description.  My claim is that the second 
formulation—the Darwin-Spencer thesis, according to which emotions ―respond 
to‖ independent moral appraisals—is a better working model of moral cognition 
with respect to this class of judgments. 
 
To see why, it is useful to look closely at the 25 ―personal‖ dilemmas devised by 
Greene and colleagues in their original fMRI study (2001) and subsequently used 
by a number of other researchers (e.g., Greene et al. 2004; Koenigs et al. 2007; 
Moore et al. 2008).  Greene found that these vignettes elicited increased activity 
in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), posterior cingulated cortex (PCC), 
superior temporal sulcus (STS), and amygdala.  Because these regions are 
associated with emotional processing, he concluded that these ―characteristically 
deontological‖ judgments are driven by emotion.  What seems to have escaped his 
notice and that of the scientific community generally, however, is that all of the 
actions described by these vignettes are well-known crimes or torts (Table 1).  
Specifically, 22 of the 25 scenarios satisfy a prima facie case for purposeful 
battery and/or intentional homicide (i.e., murder).  Two other cases involve acts of 
rape and sexual battery, while the final case describes a negligent (i.e. 
unreasonable) failure to rescue. 
 
With one exception, then, what Greene actually did in the ―personal‖ condition of 
his experiment was to put subjects in the scanner and ask them to respond to a 
series of violent crimes and torts.  There are other relevant features of these 
scenarios, of course; some of them raise principal-agent problems and others 
involve duress or necessity, for example.  Fundamentally, however, all of them 
describe acts that standard legal analysis would classify as serious wrongs, subject 
to conceivable, but ultimately weak, affirmative defenses.  Moreover, all of them 
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involve serious bodily injury and thus implicate the right to physical safety.  By 
contrast, only five of the 19 cases in Greene‘s ―impersonal‖ condition are 
batteries, and only one of these batteries is purposeful.  The other four cases 
involve foreseeable but non-purposeful harms, at least two of which admit of an 
uncontroversial necessity defense.  The remaining 14 ―impersonal‖ scenarios are 
a hodgepodge of cases that raise a variety of legal issues, including fraud, tax 
evasion, insider trading, public corruption, theft, unjust enrichment, and necessity 
as a defense to trespass to chattels.  Finally, five of these residual cases describe 
risk-risk tradeoffs in the context of vaccinations and environmental policy.  
 
The upshot is that Greene‘s (2001, 2004) original experiments did not really test 
two patterns of moral judgment—one ―deontological‖ and the other 
―utilitarian‖—as much as different categories of potentially wrongful behavior.  
The basic cleavage he identified in the brain was not Kant versus Mill, but 
purposeful battery, rape, and murder, on the one hand, and a disorderly grab bag 
of theft crimes, regulatory crimes, torts against non-personal interests, and risk-
risk tradeoffs, on the other.  Moreover, his finding that the MPFC, PCC, STS, and 
amygdala are recruited for judgment tasks involving purposeful battery, rape, and 
murder does not undermine the traditional rationalist thesis that moral precepts 
are engraved in the mind (e.g., Grotius 1625; Kant 1788; Leibniz 1705).  On the 
contrary, Greene‘s evidence largely supports that thesis.  Crimes and torts have 
elements, and the relevant pattern of intuitions is best explained by assuming that 
humans possess implicit knowledge of moral and legal rules.  Naturally, violent 
crimes and torts are more emotionally engaging than insider trading or 
environmental risk analysis, but it does not follow that emotion ―constitutes‖ or 
―drives‖ the judgment that the former acts are wrong.  Rather, what drive these 
intuitions are the unconscious computations that characterize these acts as battery, 
rape, or murder in the first place.  By mischaracterizing their own stimuli, then, 
Greene and other neuroscientists (e.g., Koenigs et al. 2007) have drawn specious 
conclusions and misconceived the nature of the problem. 
 
Returning to Darwin, the main questions for cognitive science going forward 
include (1) how the brain computes unconscious representations of purposeful 
battery, rape, murder, negligence, and other forms of harmful trespass, and (2) 
how these computations and the negative emotions they typically elicit are related 
to the complex cognitive and socio-emotional capacities that humans share with 
other animals (cf. Darwin 1981/1871; Spencer 1978/1897; see generally Mikhail 
2007, 2009, in press).  Future research should focus more squarely on these topics 
and move beyond potentially misleading pseudo-problems such as how reason 
and emotion ―duke it out‖ in the brain. 
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Dilemma Standard Legal Analysis 
1. Transplant Battery/Homicide 
2. Footbridge Battery/Homicide 
3. Country Road Negligent Failure to Rescue 
4. Architect Battery/Homicide 
5. Lifeboat Battery/Homicide 
6. Hard Times Rape/Sexual Assault and Battery 
7. Smother for dollars Battery/Homicide 
8. Safari Battery/Homicide 
9. Crying Baby Battery/Homicide 
10. Plane Crash Battery/Homicide 
11. Hired Rapist Rape/Sexual Assault and Battery 
12. Grandson Battery/Homicide 
13. Infanticide Battery/Homicide 
14. Preventing the Spread Battery/Homicide 
15. Modified Lifeboat Battery/Homicide 
16. Modified Preventing the Spread Homicide  
17. Modified Safari Battery/Homicide 
18. Modified Bomb Battery/Torture 
19. Submarine Battery/Homicide 
20. Lawrence of Arabia Battery/Homicide 
21. Sophie‘s Choice Battery/Homicide 
22. Sacrifice Homicide 
23. Vitamins Battery 
24. Vaccine Test Battery/Homicide 
25. Euthanasia Battery/Homicide 
 
Table 1: Standard Legal Analysis of Greene et al.‘s (2001) ―Personal‖ Dilemmas 
 
